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Introduction: The Trajectory of 
German Philosophy after Kant, and 
the ‘Difference’ between Fichte and 
Schelling 
 
Michael G. Vater 





“The most obvious symptoms of an epoch-making system are the 
misunderstandings and the awkward conduct of its adversaries.” 
G. W. F. Hegel, The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s 
System of Philosophy1 
 
While Hegel doubtless had Reinhold’s new interest in 
philosophical realism or perhaps Schleiermacher’s psychological 
interpretation of religious truth in mind as the ‘awkward symptoms of 
the age’ and its dichotomizing reception of Kant’s legacy when he 
penned these words, they can stand as the epitome of the relations 
between Fichte and Schelling in the years leading up to Hegel’s first 
published essay. After 1800, Fichte and Schelling each viewed the 
letters and publications of his ‘collaborator’ with suspicion. Periods of 
trust and encouragement alternated with spasms of mistrust and 
outbreaks of accusations of personal betrayal and intellectual short-
sightedness. Only one who with Hegel fervently believed in the ‘power 
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of the negative’ could be edified at the sight of titanic strife between 
powerful intellects who so deftly perceived the divisive issues of the 
times and addressed their solution with such insight and breadth of 
knowledge, but who persistently failed to identify the common position 
they were publicly seen to represent and complained instead of a 
single, massive ‘difference’ that separated them. Neither Hegel’s essay 
nor any single utterance by Fichte or Schelling exactly pins down the 
difference between them or underscores the underlying common 
position that it presumes. That work is left to the reader and her 
detective instincts. The editors and translators wish to let the texts 
speak for themselves, and by ‘texts’ they mean both the letters 
exchanged between the principals 1800-1802 and the published works 
from those years which they exchanged in hopes of resolving the 
‘difference’. We think the letters and published works have roughly 
equal standing, for when the former turn to philosophical topics they 
generally focus on very broad issues of philosophical presuppositions, 
certainty, and methodology left over after their various and intricately 
argued versions of ‘the system’ had been sent to their respective 
publishers. The letters are placed first to provide an introduction to the 
texts that follow, not because they have explanatory priority or 
because the cultural and biographical situations they reference 
illuminate the ‘difference’ better than the published works. Similarly, 
the comments we offer in the pages that follow are offered to point out 
a possible reading of the legacy of German philosophy after Kant, but 
they will not open up a royal road through the by-ways of the history 
of philosophy nor will they suggest that what the principals and their 
contemporaries saw as the one difference was the one that will 
necessarily stand today as the central philosophical issue. In 
particular, we are agnostic on Hegelian presuppositions that outcomes 
are better than prior conditions or that one can make an easy 
separation between reflection – or the work of intellect – and reason or 
intellectual intuition. No philosophical distinction can be univocally 
deployed, and if quantum indeterminacies arise in physics, one can 
hardly expect unambiguous meanings in social discourse, much less 
philosophy.  
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The Legacy of Kant  
 
“. . . [T]he metaphysics of nature as well as morals, but above all the 
preparatory (propaedeutic) critique of reason that dares to fly with its 
own wings, alone constitutes that which we call philosophy in a 
genuine sense. This relates everything to wisdom, but through the 
path of science, the only one which, once cleared, is never overgrown 
and leads to error.”  
--Immanuel Kant, Architectonic of Pure, Critique of Pure Reason 
A850/B8782  
 
By the early 1790’s the bulk of Kant’s great systematic writings 
had appeared, including the three Critiques and the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science, but it was not widely recognized that 
the critical philosophy formed a comprehensive system instead of 
multiple preliminary sketches for a future system. Kant had given the 
Critique of Pure Reason a partial re-write which distanced his position 
from idealism, furthered its claims to have definitively reconciled 
rationalism and empiricism, and announced that theoretical philosophy 
had been given a ‘scientific’ foundation by a Copernican reversal of 
perspective.3 The enduring achievement of the First Critique was to 
insist that philosophy must settle questions of foundations and 
methodology before and while it embarked on comprehensive 
explanation—that ‘quid facti?’ could not be settled without ‘quid juris?’4 
If Kant thought his contribution had ended metaphysics or the attempt 
to think the supersensible, he did not foresee how the subjective or 
Copernican turn coupled with methodological introspection could 
produce the encyclopedic adventures in world-description that would 
flow from the pens of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in the coming 
decades. The Critique of Practical Reason sliced through the theoretical 
knot of freedom and determinism, declared the primacy of practical 
reason in the phenomenon of conscience, and put the would-be 
objects of metaphysical speculation within the reach of hope or 
‘rational religion’. The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
provided a theoretical framework for empirical physics, postulating 
matter as filling space, compounded of opposite forces, supporting 
phenomenal properties such as mass and density. Both of these works 
could be viewed as tidy solutions to pesky but rather regional 
problems, as could the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment’s limited 
justification for cognitive overreach by the artist and the empirical 
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scientist of theoretical bent. Yet something of the sweep of Kant’s 
analysis and the grandeur of his philosophical nomenclature—are not 
the famous ‘transcendental deductions’ the consummate Rube 
Goldberg inventions?—seemed to inflate his philosophical results 
beyond his personal intentions, and the wind which soon filled the sails 
of the good ship Transcendental Idealism carried it swiftly out of safe 
empirical harbor into uncharted oceans of ‘Speculation’.5 And despite 
the popular message conveyed by the Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics that the transcendental critique had slain the dragon of 
dogmatism, Kant’s own tidiness in crafting distinctions may have 
paved the way for the resurrection of robustly nonempirical philosophy 
in the succeeding decades, for he closes the First Critique by insisting 
upon the distinction between a ‘propaedeutical’ or preparatory function 
of critique and the full systematic investigation of the reach of reason 
in nature and morals that could legitimately be called metaphysics.6 A 
plausible, though none too tidy, reading of the state of ‘Transcendental 
Philosophy’ at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century could view Kant 
as having definitely established the propaedeutic to an experiential 
metaphysics, while Fichte and Schelling were hard at work attempting 
to expand and consolidate the foundations of the metaphysics of 
morals and metaphysics of nature that Kant had left behind. In this 
broad sense, Schelling and Fichte believed they were collaborators on 
a shared ‘scientific’ enterprise; even when they had misgivings about 
each other, they were still eager to have the public perceive them as 
united under the banner of Transcendental Philosophy-- as if it were 
genuinely the ‘perennial philosophy’ engendered by modernity, and 
not just an isolated contribution.  
 
Whatever Kant himself said about the future of philosophy, his 
texts seem to point to quite different, though equally fertile, territories 
of development once philosophy had torn itself away from the delusory 
project of trying to make definite theoretical pronouncements about 
the supposedly ultimate anthropological, psychological and moral 
frameworks of human life.7 Reinhold laid hold of the territory of 
epistemology (and later on, logic) in his attempt to create a positive 
‘Kantian’ system that was in some sense empirically based or 
‘objective. After a brief initial flirtation with Reinhold’s foundationalism, 
Fichte staked out the moral domain as his field of endeavor and sought 
to enlarge the phenomenon of ‘conscience’—on the model of Kant’s 
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categorical imperative—into a model of world-embodied consciousness 
as such, closer to what we would today call ‘phenomenology’ than 
other forms of contemporary philosophy. Schelling, schooled in Plato’s 
Timaeus as well as Kantian critique, sought to expand Kant’s 
fragmentary account of matter as impenetrability-in-space to a holistic 
account of the physical sciences, one based more on the emerging 
chemistry and biology of the new century than on Kant’s Newtonian 
materialism. And Hegel would take up Kant’s systematic ‘leftovers’– 
religion, social philosophy, economics, politics and history—and fashion 
them into an account of human reality so bold and sweeping that it 
dropped the labels ‘transcendental’ or ‘critical’ and proclaimed itself 
absolute or objective idealism. But this suggestion considerably 
oversimplifies the matter, for Kant’s heirs did not parcel up the 
master’s domain and each set to work upon his own claimed turf; each 
contended he was the sole inheritor of the whole estate and laid claim 
to transcendental philosophy from his own point of the compass. Our 
‘history of philosophy’--an art invented by Reinhold, Schelling, and 
Hegel-- tries to make sense of the tussle in a linear fashion, but 
neither chronological order nor the metaphor of spaces divided into 
different regions or by different directions quite succeeds in making 
clear sense of German philosophy from 1790 through 1820.8 
Furthermore, though we must be content today to view philosophy as 
an autonomous though peripheral stage of human endeavor, the 
German-speaking lands of the early Nineteenth Century were guided 
by ‘public intellectuals’ who were comfortable moving in multiple 
disciplines that we think widely disparate—religion and politics, 
philosophy and art, creative art and literary criticism, and even poetry 
and empirical science.  
 
The End of Modernity: ‘Open Sky’ or System?  
 
“. . . [Even] after the labors of Kant and Reinhold, philosophy is still 
not a science. [Schulze’s] Aenesidemus has shaken my own system to 
its very foundations, and since one cannot very well live under the 
open sky, I was forced to construct a new system.”  
J. G. Fichte, draft of a letter to J. F. Flatt, late 17939  
 
In many ways the end of the Eighteenth Century in Europe was 
as disquieting and unnerving as it was filled with promise. Neither 
Kant’s high-flown transcendental arguments for a legislative role for 
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intellect in human cognition nor Reinhold’s ordinary-language attempt 
to make the same point through an analysis of representation which 
hovered somewhere between psychology and epistemology could 
counter the power of willful doubt. The old order was crumbing, the 
authority of established powers, political and ecclesiastical, was 
undercut, and a new spirit of experimentalism-- neither as open or 
candid as Goethe’s Werther nor as certain and self-assertive as the 
never-aging Faust of that drama’s second part-- took over the literary 
and scientific worlds. The world of knowledge was expanding, though 
not yet beyond the capacities of singular intellects of encyclopedic 
reach and genuine diversity; musicians became astronomers, poets 
became ministers of state, and newly minted scientific disciplines were 
captained by entrepreneurs working in carriage-houses rather than 
universities. Though the cultivated celebrated the cult of ‘genius’, the 
mob was at work in the street below---or the country just over the 
border—and the world of learning was just waking to the subterranean 
movements of social groups, of economic activity and international 
trade, and of political organization and conflict. Fichte’s words echo the 
resolve of one who has no choice but to rebuild in just the place the 
earthquake has brought down the house. System, though perhaps 
claustrophobic or leaky (as Kierkegaard and Heidegger reminded us10) 
is at least shelter against the open sky of uncertainty and lack of 
direction. Whether one can find eternal foundations is a chancy 
prospect once one has been forced to give in to Galileo and admit that 
the earth moves.  
 
The inflated rhetoric of one of Kant’s ‘deductions’—or of those 
constructed with such ingenuity by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in his 
footsteps – hides the absence of an interlocutor or the background 
murmur of the skeptic who finds talk of postulating unseen but 
necessary conditions for the possibility of experience every bit as 
obtuse as the flat-footed assertions of vulgar realists and idealists who 
claim they see ‘things’ or ‘sensations’. Underneath the interminable 
deductions are dodgy start-points and perplexing methodologies 
secured by uneasy comparison to cognitive domains that we ordinarily 
think actually ‘work’ such as mathematics or geometry. These scientific 
pretenders have put themselves in dignified dress and walk about in 
public as ‘synthetic method’, or ‘intellectual intuition’, or ‘dialectic’—but 
Heidegger tartly reminds us the apt riposte of the anti-systematic 
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Friedrich Schlegel to the concept of a fundamental ‘dialectic of identity 
and difference’: “A definition which is not funny is not worthwhile.”11 
And if our professional philosophers are not often so loose as to find 
each others’ starting-points and methodologies a matter of humor, 
they do pointedly ignore each others’ detailed arguments and go for 
the quick: to question whether the foundation or premises are clear 
and persuasive, or as the geometers say are evident, whether the 
argument in general is transparent or mere subterfuge, and hence 
whether the claimed result or quod erat demonstrandum actually 
follows. Whereas most academic philosophers were and are fairly 
confident that they can either charm or stupefy in the lecture-hall, 
those who conduct their business in private correspondence are both 
more honest and direct. So just as the wise reader will find it 
unprofitable to doze by the fire with the author of the Meditations on 
First Philosophy and will go to the Objections and Replies for some 
fresh air, the reader of the vast systems of the German idealists will 
turn to comments of public critics to get a handle on her authors, or, 
in our case, to the letters Fichte and Schelling exchanged in their 
‘growth years’, where packed between tidbits of business and gossip--
and some over-wrought accusations and histrionics--one can find 
some earnest attempts to probe and uncover foundations and 
(un)certainties.  
 
Just as Socratic elenchus and Platonic dialectic had as their 
social background the aggressive confrontations of that singular Greek 
invention, the law-court, one might argue that the one-into-many, I-
into-not I, identity-into-difference, and I-into-We gymnastics of the 
new dialectic practiced by Kant’s successors had as much to do with 
the plurality of social voices and the social conflicts unleashed by 
Enlightenment and Revolution as with the self-undermining 
ratiocination that Kant diagnosed as the conduct of empty concepts 
loosed from the controls of sensible intuition. Before the political ‘old 
order’ dissolved in the tumultuous events in France that began with 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, the voices of 
‘enlightened’ social critics such Hume and Adam Smith, Voltaire and 
Diderot, and Lessing and Herder had attacked the power of ancient 
institutions and entrenched beliefs and had begun to show that 
complex systems of human reason and sensibility, social organization 
and individual initiative, deployed over a spectrum of development 
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that was both natural and historical, underpinned the emergence of 
‘bourgeois man’. But the old order did not spontaneous combust or 
disintegrate into the chaos of the Parisian mob or the frenzied blood-
bath of ‘public safety’ officials, at least in German lands where some 
sense of sanctity, order, and history combined with ‘enlightened policy’ 
and a penchant for learning kept the most progressive minds occupied 
in the corridors of power—seminaries, courts, and universities. Battles 
were fought, of course, but largely with the pen and not the sword.  
 
The Quarrel between Philosophy and Poesie 
 
“Unending free activity arises in us through free renunciation of the 
absolute—the only possible absolute that can be given us and that we 
only find through our inability to attain and know an absolute.”  
Novalis, Fichte Studies #56612  
 
One can frame the disagreements of Fichte and Schelling in the 
context of four notable debates or ‘culture-war’ skirmishes that 
irrupted in German lands late in the Eighteenth Century, and which 
pitted literary giants, the so-called classicists and romantics, against 
philosophers. The first two surround the ‘rehabilitation’ of Spinoza, 
though perhaps the ‘re-‘ is a misnomer, since even in the free-thinking 
low countries of the Seventeenth Century Spinoza could not teach in 
any public way nor have visible disciples in the academy. The 
conversations on Spinoza between the Enlightenment dramatist, 
historian, critic, and advocate of religious tolerance Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing and the younger anti-Kantian polemicist and novelist Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi that occurred in July of 1780 touched off a thirty-year 
fire-storm of pamphlets, tracts, and denunciations that are generally 
referred to as the ‘Pantheism Controversy’. Whether Lessing was 
engaging in sly humor or being quite sincere in confessing to Jacobi 
that he was a Spinozist—read ‘atheist’, ‘determinist’, ‘nihilist’ –Jacobi 
was unambiguous in his response, which was to jump off the cliff of 
rationalism in hope that a salto mortale into the ‘I know not what’ of 
faith (Glaube) would save him from the murky hen kai pan of Lessing 
and later the Jena romantics. The literary fracas between Jacobi and 
Lessing’s posthumous defender, Moses Mendelssohn, guaranteed that 
the very words ‘Spinoza’, ‘pantheism’, and ‘faith’ provoked immediate 
reaction for decades to come, visible everywhere from Goethe’s Faust 
to the Correspondence between Fichte and Schelling, and even to 
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Hegel’s Faith and Knowledge.13 Lessing and Jacobi’s conversations 
triggered a deep confrontation between skeptical and traditional voices 
in the ‘enlightened’ world. The second contest was a repercussion of 
the first: by the 1790’s suddenly Spinoza was fashionable, even touted 
as the only logically consistent dogmatist, whether or not one wanted 
to stand with him. Everyone wanted to find some sort of ‘synthesis’ of 
Spinozistic pantheism or determinism with whatever seemed to still 
work of the old humanism – the Poesie of the romantics, the 
voluntarism of the transcendental idealists, and the belief in religious 
inspiration among orthodox theologians. Whether these elements can 
be mixed without provoking inconsistency, laughter or ‘dialectic’, 
everyone wanted to try his hand at it. Kant’s posthumous notes from 
quite late in his life suggest that even he dabbled with Spinozism. At 
one point he comments that Spinozism, with its “seeing all things in 
God,” is quite like transcendental idealism in wanting to adumbrate a 
system of all possible objects of experience under one principle; at 
another Kant calls Spinoza, Schelling, and Lichtenberg [a follower of 
Fichte and a Naturphilosoph] the “past, present, and future of 
transcendental philosophy.”14 Fichte’s letters to Schelling bristle with 
accusations of him being ‘soft on Spinozism’. Fichte had been offended 
at the young Schelling’s suggestion (in the 1775 Philosophical Letters 
Dogmatism and Criticism) that one could view Spinozism and Critical 
Philosophy as equally valid philosophies. For Fichte, one’s decision 
between the two will be led by one’s interest: if one is interested in 
things one will opt for Spinozism, if in becoming a free agent, for 
Criticism.15 At one point in the Correspondence Schelling recalls an 
apparently damning line from Fichte’s 1794 Foundations of the Entire 
Wissenschaftslehre where the author suggests that the theoretical part 
of the Wissenschaftslehre is “Spinozism made systematic,” except that 
every I is itself the one substance.16  
 
The latter two debates are more about means than ends, for 
everyone in Germany more or less agreed that Kant was on target 
with a morality of conscience or obligation rather than results, and that 
the synoptic view of reality promoted by the natural sciences could and 
should be reconciled with an updated humanism that integrated the 
private conscience of the individual and the social power of 
communities, economic association and small- and large-scale political 
entities. Friedrich Schiller and Fichte took different routes to a 
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naturalistic morality of conscience, the former suggesting an aesthetic-
psychological attunement of reason and sensibility as a tool for mass 
moral education, the latter dramatically bringing the Categorical 
Imperative from the philosophers’ Olympus down to the market-place 
in a social philosophy that made the Other both the limit of my will and 
the remote source of the objectivity of all my perceptions. Schiller’s On 
the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters (1793-95) 
tempered the rigor of Kant’s uncompromising demands centered on 
universality, the dignity of the moral agent, and a projected social 
order that secured both freedom and dignity with the anthropological 
concerns about moral pedagogy and behavioral reinforcement; the 
empty play of opposed faculties which Kant had nodded to in his 
analysis of aesthetic creativity had a positive social function—
education into a lively and motivating sense of human equality, free 
from the ambiguity of Kant’s term, ‘autonomy’. What was essentially 
creative in Schiller’s reading of Kant was to use the Third Critique as a 
tool for reading Kant’s moral philosophy. Fichte’s philosophy is more 
centrally concerned with the moral order as envisioned by Kant 
himself, where the appearance of an other will opposite mine both 
limits my agency and provides the ‘push back’ that shows up in 
cognition as the feeling of necessity (or ‘reality’) correlated with 
perception and in a natural order of ‘things’ constructed from 
perceptions. That the other is the ‘limit of my will’ is an idea that goes 
back to Moses Maimonides17; that both ‘my’ will and that of putative 
others arises only in an intersubjective framework is a strikingly 
modern idea, especially since Fichte makes the willing that I am and 
the constraint of the other the primitive entities of his transcendental 
philosophy, much the way we commonly project biological, social, and 
primitive moral constraints as the basis of our neo-Darwinian 
anthropological explanations. The core of the social order and the legal 
framework that cements it is the shared intuition that “I must limit my 
freedom by the possibility of the freedom of the other.”18  
A final disagreement concerns the different directions that the 
romantic writers and literary critics of Jena and the post-Kantian 
idealists took in fashioning an account of the realms of nature and 
freedom, and of the tension between the role of the individual and the 
influence of the social whole within the world critically regulated 
conduct. Though both Fichte and Schelling shared certain enthusiasms 
and especially political beliefs with the Jena romantics, there was a 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Texts and Correspondence, 1800-1802, (2012): pg. 1-20. 
Publisher Link. This article is © SUNY Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-
Publications@Marquette. SUNY Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from SUNY Press. 
11 
 
mutual distrust among them, based in part on the competition for 
public forums for their views. A good deal of the Fichte-Schelling 
Correspondence in 1800 and early in 1801 recounts intrigues around 
the founding and editorship of a ‘common front’ journal that would 
generally advance the cause of transcendental philosophy and 
specifically review recent contributions in science, art, and letters that 
harmonized (or failed to harmonize) with the Kantian spirit. Beyond 
this competition for access to the educated public, the philosophers 
and literary spirits of Jena took decidedly different approaches to 
locating the source of human freedom, Fichte and Schelling in general 
looking to the tensions and movements of the social whole, while the 
poets, critics and theologians of the Romantic Circle started and ended 
with the human individual.  
 
G. F. P. Hardenberg (‘Novalis’), for example, had a complicated 
relationship to Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. His earnest study of the 
1794 Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre propelled him, in 
the name of freedom, to a radically free-form, anti-systematic form of 
philosophizing. Breaking with Fichte pointedly in the matter of form, 
Novalis advocated a micro-philosophy that encapsulated the whole of 
phenomenal reality—which Fichte had tried to catalog and laboriously 
‘deduce,--in the singular poetic insight. “An authentic philosophical 
system must systematize freedom and unendingness, or, to express it 
more strikingly, it must systematize systemlessness,” he writes in 
1796-96.19 Working on a complex theory of signs where an individual 
item or ‘trace’ can function now as a subject, now as an object, Novalis 
attempts to capture the self-sundering, self-objectifying, and 
ultimately self-recognizing creativity of the Fichtean I as a play in 
which there is no privileged position: “Being, being-I, being free and 
oscillating are all synonyms—one expression refers to the others—it is 
simply the matter of a single fact.”20  
 
At the time that concerns us, Schelling was most influenced by 
Ludwig Tieck of all the Jena romantics, and it is probable that through 
Tieck and Novalis he became acquainted with the theosophical dramas 
of Jakob Böhme which would figure so prominently in his speculations 
on God, freedom, and the nature of evil that occupied his thought from 
1809-1815. Through Böhme, Tieck introduced the idea of religious 
conversion, organic unity with nature, and the practice of highly 
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idiosyncratic creativity or Poesie to the Jena circle.21 The retrieval of 
‘old and curious things,’ medieval religion included, was a mark of 
Tieck’s influence. Poesie was infinitely flexible in form, capable of 
retrieval of the past and prophetic flights to a utopian future. Its 
practitioners were not constrained, as were their philosophical fellow-
travelers, to account for the world as it is, hence their unconventional, 
if not anarchic practices, launched under the banner of the harmony of 
truth, beauty and freedom. In romantic hands, fiction freed itself from 
verisimilitude and became prized as a world-transforming power. 
 
Friedrich Schlegel was probably the most philosophically erudite 
author of the Romantic Circle. Between the years 1796 and 1801 he 
attended Fichte’s lectures and undertook lengthy studies of Kant, 
Herder, Fichte and Spinoza. His philosophy is as nonfoundationalist 
and antisystematic as that of Hardenberg and its mode of expression 
even more striking. He championed an ideal of art as ‘formed chaos’, 
and prized wit, irony, and narratives incapable of definite 
interpretation as the ways to open up an infinity of perspectives. 
Schlegel’s idea of romantic ‘form’ was universal and all-embracing, 
committed to mixing genres and overturning fixed convention. Like 
Novalis, his reaction to Fichte’s endless and tightly wrought deductions 
involved the deliberate antithesis, the embrace of the fragment, which 
“like a small work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the 
surrounding world and be complete in itself like a hedgehog.”22 
Schlegel’s idea of philosophical system-- quite unlike Fichte’s 1794 
three ground-principles or the flexible mixed method of the 1796/99 
nova methodo lectures where intellectual intuition, hypothesis, 
deduction, and bridging synthesis are all deployed to bring one as near 
as possible to the whole truth23 --was blatantly circular, and open to 
utilizing not only alternative proofs but alternative concepts. 
Essentially agreeing with Novalis that “Everywhere we seek the 
unconditioned [das Unbedingte], but find only things [Dinge],” 
Schlegel finds in the romantic work of art a complete universe, an 
exercise of creativity that, freed from the external reference of 
classical canons or conventional realism, provides its own criterion and 
which erases the boundary between the work of art and criticism.24 
Most importantly for our concerns, Schlegel hoped to produce a 
synthesis of Fichte’s philosophy of freedom with Spinoza’s naturalism, 
a hope shared by Schelling at least in the years 1799-1801.25  
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‘Atheism’ and the Turn toward Philosophical Religion  
 
“True atheism, genuine unbelief and godlessness, consists in 
pettifogging over the consequences of one’s actions, of refusing to 
hearken to the voice of one’s own conscience . . . The living and 
efficaciously acting moral order is itself God. We require no other God, 
nor can we grasp any other.”  
J. G. Fichte, On the Basis of a Belief in a Divine Governance of the 
World (1798)26  
 
If the above words had not forced Fichte to resign his 
professorship in Jena and depart for Berlin in June of 1799, we would 
not have the remarkable series of letters that passed between Fichte 
and Schelling in the succeeding two years. In effect, Fichte had fired 
himself from the tolerant University of Jena rather than receive a ‘slap 
on the wrist’ reprimand from the Weimar Court over his publication of 
a blatantly atheistic article by F. K. Forberg in his Philosophical Journal 
entitled “On the Development of the Concept of Religion,” which he 
prefaced with his own essay that was rather tame by Enlightenment 
standards and not far removed from the spirit, if not the letter, of 
Kant’s moral religion. Academic freedom was well-respected at Jena, 
though the Weimar Court had technically acceded to the demands of 
the Saxony Court, which in response to the complaints of an outraged 
parent, had ordered all copies of the offending essays seized and 
destroyed and threatened to withdraw all its students from Jena. With 
characteristic overreaction, Fichte had announced beforehand that he 
would resign if censured, and so he removed himself from the hotbed 
of transcendental idealism that Jena had become in the 1790’s to a life 
of relative obscurity in Berlin. Weimar issued its pro-forma rescript 
with an acceptance of Fichte’s resignation appended.27  
 
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Fichte’s claim in 
1798 that we can grasp no God other a living and effective moral 
order, but as his thinking unfolds in 1799 though 1802, much more 
ontological weight accrues to this entity or force that comes to be 
viewed as the ground of what humans experience as consciousness, 
nature, and the intersubjective nest of right, obligation and moral 
demand. In The Vocation of Man (1800) Fichte begins to speak of 
‘faith’ (Glaube), the situation where the actual world is seen as ringed 
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by and determined through the immediate consciousness of a pre-
orientation of our freedom and power toward a rational end, the future 
perfection of humanity. “We act not because we know, but we know 
because we are called upon to act.”28 The finite I is fundamentally will 
or deed, its own act, and causal chains of consequences extend from it 
not only in the world of appearance but in an invisible or intelligible 
order. One can only think of a harmonization of such agents in an 
‘absolute will,’ whose function is to be the bond of the spiritual world 
and enable will to act upon will. Whether this ‘absolute will’ is really 
another will or just an abstract aspect of my will in double appearance 
as the voice of conscience commanding me to respect the Other and 
my pure obedience to the command, it is clear that Fichte’s absolute 
will is a ‘moral God’ as figured in this popular work. The Infinite Will is 
itself the moral order.29  
 
The unity-and-community of willing that Fichte sketches in 1800 
looks quite a bit like Leibniz’s kaleidoscope of monads refracting and 
apparently interacting with one another upon the ground of a prime 
monad or cosmic actor-presenter. Fichte struggles to give a properly 
philosophical account of this ‘intelligible world’ over the next two 
years. His letters to Schelling repeatedly turn to the promise that the 
elaboration of the intelligible realm will clarify all obscurities in the 
Wissenschaftslehre, or to talk of a ‘final synthesis’. Schelling confesses 
he cannot follow this new ‘doctrine of religion’ and so can do no more 
than suspend judgment on the Wissenschaftslehre in its current 
incomplete form.30 But Fichte sporadically persisted in his attempts to 
think through this ultimate ground in theoretical terms as the ground 
of consciousness. In one letter to Schelling, he notes there is a huge 
difference between embedding a system in a ‘fundamental reflex’ 
(Grundreflex) and trying to ground a system upon ‘reflection’.31 He 
does not there explain what the difference is, but in the 1800 New 
Version of the Wissenschaftslehre, he provide several hints: the 
Grundreflex is what Kant called the ‘I think’ that necessarily 
accompanies all definite acts of consciousness, or the omnipresent 
activity that precedes all consciousness as its necessary condition. It is 
also called the self-determining intuition prior to the I’s determined 
consciousness that displays itself in finite states of consciousness and 
actions, or the ‘pure reflex’ that is prior to the subject.32 The ‘Historical 
Narrative’ of the early pages of this manuscript refers back to concepts 
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like the ‘self-reversion’ of the 1794 Foundations and the ‘agility’ and 
‘intellectual intuition’ of the nova method lectures given in 1796-
1799.33  
 
The New Version is a fragmentary manuscript, and to illuminate 
it one must turn to an even stranger manuscript, the 
Wissenschaftslehre of 1801-1802. Here Fichte’s late-found 
philosophical theism reaches it apogee in the idea of an absolute 
being, related to the absolute knowing that the Wissenschaftslehre 
reconstructs by a ‘hiatus’ or chasm’; inside absolute knowing, being is 
indeed related to knowing, but this relation is grounded in the absolute 
or being itself, not in knowing.34 In one passage, the ‘Grundreflex’ 
seems to be given a clear and unambiguous meaning, but one that 
associates it with ‘absolute being’ rather than the consciousness-
associated descriptors of ‘agility’ or ‘self-reversion’ or Kant’s ever-self-
present ‘I think’:  
 
Lastly, what was the ground of this idea of a closed system of 
mutually determined intelligences, determined in the pure 
thought of reason-intuition and the perception-thought derived 
from it? It was absolute being itself, which conditions knowing—
and is hence an absolute mutual penetration of the two. The 
deepest root of all knowing is, the unattainable union of pure 
thought and the thought of the perception that we have 
described. This [union] equals the moral law, the most sublime 
case of all intuition, since it comprehends intelligence as its own 
absolute real-ground. This union is absolutely not a matter of 
this or that kind of knowing, but absolute knowing, simply as 
such.35  
 
Though he initially mocked Fichte’s theistic turn,36 Schelling 
soon enough found it easy to turn from talk of an absolute identity 
that is the ground of all quantitative difference among appearances 
(an ‘indifference’ or neither-nor of all possible predicates and states) 
back to the name ‘God,’ whose philosophical meaning Kant had 
glossed as the compendium of all possible predicates.37 Prompted by 
the naturalist and mathematician Carl Eschenmayer, who argued that 
identity-philosophy provided not an steep ascent to the absolute, but a 
highway to a base-camp from which any further journey must be 
undertaken not by philosophy but by faith,38 Schelling begins to call 
the ‘absolute’ God in his 1804 Philosophy and Religion, and to make 
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moves to clarify his rather imprecise and ‘personal’ idea of intellectual 
intuition: Intellectual intuition is: (a) neither a perception of inner 
sense which finite understanding turns into a concept, nor (b) is it 
compendium of all possible predicates, nor their universal disjunction, 
nor the common element in all predicates, nor (c) is it a private, 
psychological event.39 Schelling provides a more precise positive 
discussion in the 1804 lectures on The System of Philosophy in 
Genera. It involves a five-step argument that starts from three theses 
put forward in the 1801 Presentation of My System -- (1) that knowing 
involves identity of knower and known, (2) that reason transcends 
subjectivity or personality, and (3) that reason’s sole rule is the law of 
identity—and adds two new theses, (4) that God is the content of 
reason’s self-recognizing self-affirmation, and (5) that this self-
affirmation involves insight into the impossibility of nihilism and so 
answers Leibniz’s fundamental question: ‘Why is there something 
rather than nothing?’40 Thus understood, intellectual intuition delivers 
an impersonal and atemporal background of reason free of 
subjectivity; it supplies only modal necessity, not the kind of 
knowledge mediated by perception that can result is existential 
propositions. Whether at this high altitude of discussion there is any 
convergence between Fichte’s Grundreflex and Schelling’s intellectual 
intuition-- or whether the one is inevitably still ‘idealistic’ and the other 
‘realistic’--is something which cannot be decided here. It seems a 
contest between a claimed omnipresent intuition ‘I think’ that 
accompanies every concrete state of mind and an unavoidable horizon 
of thinking that must always pronounce ‘There must be something 
rather than nothing’. Put into propositions, each formula delivers a 
distorted version of a fundamental experience, a completely global 
horizon of consciousness, or an identically infinite horizon of being.  
 
‘The Difference’ between Fichte and Schelling, 
1800-1802  
 
“One cannot proceed from a being . . . , but one has to proceed from a 
seeing.”  
Letter 19, Fichte in Berlin to Schelling in Jena, May 31 – August 7, 
1801  
 
The Correspondence which this volume presents as an 
introduction to a handful of crucial works of both philosophers in the 
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pertinent years is full of the chaos of life and as well as earnestness of 
thought. We will bypass the matters of personalities and publishers,41 
and head straight for the most problematic issue: though both parties 
contend there is but one difference that separates them, each phrases 
it in a different way or sidesteps the issue and instead discusses minor 
difficulties that present themselves at the moment, perhaps in what 
the other party said in the last letter.  
 
By way of introduction to the letters, we can list three 
candidates for ‘the difference’ which are relatively distinct as long as 
we treat them abstractly. In any given patch of the discussion, they 
may be intermingled or interwoven. It is natural in cataloging the 
shortcomings of an adversary, or a friend who has brought 
disappointment, to move from one offense to the other, and this is 
typically the way the episodes of ‘pure’ philosophizing in the letters 
unfold.  
 
The Status of Being in Transcendental Idealism  
 
Fichte took up the Kantian heritage in a doubly idealistic way, 
adopting not only the general methodology of transcendental 
explanation but taking the Kantian analysis of moral obligation as the 
key clue for deciphering the nature of consciousness. Unlike most of 
modern philosophy up to Reinhold, the primitive data for Fichtean 
phenomenology are not ‘representation’ and the subject which has the 
representation; instead, there is a single situation in which the self-
activity of an agent finds itself limited, strives to push back one and 
every boundary, and comes to a satisfaction at once limited and 
extensive in an intersubjective context of recognition and realization 
shared by many finite subjects. Representation floats on a dynamic 
surface of interactions which morph into the biological and 
psychological phenomena of embodied consciousness—feelings, 
strivings, drives—and only on top of that interactive basis can ‘objects’ 
and ‘perceptions’ be established. The 1794 Foundations of the Entire 
Wissenschaftslehre, a provisional student handout that was liable to be 
misread in several important ways, needed to be read backwards to 
reveal this doubly idealist perspective: there are no things as such, no 
presentations either, no stationary states of being, and no beings.  
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Schelling’s early essays moved in the more conventional 
framework of Kantian epistemology, with subjects and objects, 
representations and entities, categories and intuitions treated in a 
conventional or reified manner. Schelling’s chief argument for the 
subjectivity of the absolute, as he imagined it early on, was the 
impossibility of an infinite entity being an object or having thing-like 
existence. Hence, though both Fichte’s and Schelling’s philosophical 
ambitions were of similarly wide or systematic scope, from the very 
first Fichte’s path was to fashion the Wissenschaftslehre from within, 
from self-activity and self-intuition, while Schelling worked on a vast 
fresco deployed over an external assemblage of objects, fundamentally 
alien even though artistry could transform them into a temple of spirit. 
This preference for thought over live intuition, for being or being-
determined over self-determination endlessly irritated Fichte, though 
Schelling on his part did not react well to numerous hints, direct, 
indirect, and some even delivered by way of written comments to third 
parties, that he ‘didn’t get it’.42  
 
The heart of the face-off over the priority of intuition or being in 
transcendental philosophy comes fairly late in the exchange, after 
Fichte has read and commented on Schelling’s Presentation of My 
System of Philosophy. Commenting on Schelling’s new standpoint, 
Fichte maintains that the new system has being or an absolute real-
ground as its principle, even if that principle is given the lofty name 
‘reason’. Philosophy, he argues, must proceed from a seeing, not a 
being. If it starts from anything other than a living intuition of self-
activity (‘intellectual intuition’), it is simply realism, a greater or lesser 
sketch of Spinozism, and is quite unable to account for freedom or 
spontaneous activity and the consciousness that derives from it.43 
Schelling’s reply suggests there is no privileged access to an 
underlying realm of activity or spontaneous self-reversion in 
consciousness; Fichte simply starts from the surface phenomena of 
apparent freedom and deduces his way to an ultimate real-ground, but 
the procedure is arbitrary and invented, much like Kant’s concoction of 
moral philosophy between the book-end postulates of freedom and 
God. Schelling proceeds to undiplomatically poke fun at the Vocation 
of Man for locating the real-ground wholly beyond the realm of 
knowing, in faith. He suggests that as early as the 1795 Letters on 
Dogmatism and Criticism he has, perhaps inarticulately and 
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‘sentimentally’, pointed beyond idealism to a reconciling element, 
being, which truly comprehends both itself and its other.44 The Letters 
had been an early flashpoint between the two philosophers; in reply to 
Schelling’s contention that one can arbitrary choose to be a realist or 
idealist, and that both constructions may have useful purchase, Fichte 
argued in the 1797 First Introduction that one’s character will dictate 
the choice of one’s philosophy, and that only a person too slack to be 
interested in freedom will opt for a world-picture that makes him a 
thing among things. “The kind of philosophy one chooses thus depends 
on the person one is. For a philosophical system is not a lifeless 
household item one can put aside or pick up as one wishes; instead it 
is animated by the very soul of the person who adopts it.”45  
 
The Role of Nature in Freedom  
 
As soon as Schelling began to develop a philosophy of nature 
under the aegis of transcendental philosophy in 1797, Fichte became 
uneasy. When he studied the 1800 System of Transcendental 
Idealism, he was troubled both by the way that work granted 
explanatory priority to nature rather than consciousness, and way 
nature seemed to be viewed alongside consciousness as an 
independent domain. Following Kant’s concept of matter as the 
impenetrable occupation of space based on the interaction of one 
activity with another, Schelling constructs a model of nature developed 
from graduated levels of dynamic action and interaction. Fichte finds 
this contrary to the method of transcendental idealism, where 
intelligence arises not from brute interactions of unintelligent forces, 
but, as in moral agency, from self-limitation.46 He writes to Schelling 
that transcendental philosophy cannot grant an independent status to 
nature—or to consciousness either. It must instead fictionally construct 
both from the same real-ideal activity of the I. Nature can appear to 
Wissenschaftslehre only as something found, finished, perfected—
operating according to the laws of intelligence because it has been 
abstracted from intelligence and nurtured as a fictional construct.47 
One could infer that whatever activity and development are found in 
nature come from the artistry inherent in science.  
 
Schelling response gives notice to Fichte that his anxieties are 
not misplaced. Rather than acknowledge that Wissenschaftslehre and 
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philosophy are coextensive, Schelling regards the former as a 
propaedeutic to the latter. Philosophy arises only when the philosopher 
abstracts from the subjectivity that posited the subject-object in an 
ideal or psychological mode and proceeded to examine the human 
faculties of mind; the abstraction evidently threshes the activity found 
in Wissenschaftslehre from its personal hull and enables the 
philosopher to work with the ‘pure’ subject-object, the principle of 
theoretical or natural philosophy. Only as a result of observing and 
describing the self-construction of reality in nature-philosophy can the 
philosopher, in a separate-but-equal transcendental science, launch 
into the construction of consciousness on the basis of organic and 
animate nature. Schelling points in his Introduction to the genetically 
organized System of Transcendental Idealism proper as the place 
where he signaled the equiprimordial status of transcendental and 
natural philosophies and cut himself loose from the “mere logic” of 
Fichte’s construction.48 The essential structure of identity-philosophy, 
which Schelling will unveil in the spring of the next year, is in place: 
philosophy is a tripartite but organic whole, introduced by a logic or 
abstract metaphysics of identity, and fleshed out by two 
complementary real-philosophies, those of nature and of 
consciousness. 
 
Fichte first reply is a letter he left unsent.49 His displeasure is 
quite evident. The best that philosophy of nature can do to explain 
nature is to analogically import the vitality of consciousness into 
nature; that may produce a heuristic account for the actor-observer, 
but it nowhere touches anything outside of finite consciousness. 
Though in this sense, nature can be explained from consciousness, the 
reverse will never obtain. Consciousness is sui generis, and any 
attempt to back away from this lands one in the muddled Spinozism of 
Schlegel and Schleiermacher, or the even more muddled realism of 
Reinhold and Bardili.50 Fichte penned and sent a quieter response 
which simply noted that Schelling’s philosophy of nature does not 
follow from the principles of transcendental idealism, as previously 
understood, but would require an expansion of those principles. The 
“transcendental philosophy of the intelligible” which he soon hoped to 
write, would provide such an expansion.51 The unsent draft supplies 
more detail on how this might happen: previous versions of the 
Wissenschaftslehre brought to light the nature of finite consciousness, 
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the awareness of an apparently external reality sandwiched between 
activity that manifests as feeling and the command of conscience. A 
theory of the intelligible world would expand the account to the 
noumenal order, and Fichte seems to give hope to the idea that nature 
could be given a philosophical account on the basis of this noumenal 
activity, which he also calls ‘God’.52  
 
In the 1800 New Version of the Wissenschaftslehre there is 
mention of the author’s intent to oppose Schelling’s separate 
philosophy of nature, but aside from the general line of argumentation, 
that object-consciousness--hence object-oriented presentation or 
activity-- necessarily presupposes an immediate self-consciousness 
which is prereflexive and cannot itself be an object of consciousness, 
no clear line of argument against Schelling’s view of nature is 
formulated.53 In the Preface to his 1801 Presentation of My System, 
Schelling made clear that he had always presented philosophy of 
nature alongside transcendental philosophy, not as subordinate to it or 
derived from anything less than the ‘absolute identity’ or ‘indifference’ 
of the natural and the transcendental that the new system asserts. 
Though in letters to Fichte he contends that conscious intelligence is 
just a higher potency of activity in nature, and hence in some sense 
emergent from natural organization,54 My System concludes its 
Spinozistic deduction of absolute identity and the framework of nature 
with the promise to first purify activity in organic nature until the 
account arrives at the absolute indifference-point, and from there 
construct a separate wholly positive account of the three levels that 
displayed themselves negatively in inorganic and animate nature. It is 
not quite clear whether at this point in his philosophical development, 
Schelling thinks that consciousness exists alongside nature or as part 
of nature or as emergent within nature.55 It is clear, however, that 
none of these versions of ‘naturalism’ are acceptable to Fichte.  
 
Though Fichte’s reading notes of Schelling’s new system do not 
often refer to nature, the 1801-1802 Wissenschaftslehre demonstrates 
a positive attempt on Fichte’s part to refute what he takes to be the 
strongest form of Schelling’s naturalism—the emergent or 
developmental view that consciousness rests on, presumes, and in 
some sense is dependent upon its organic basis in nature. One can 
perhaps think of consciousness as originating in some primordial 
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freedom, he argues, but one cannot perceive that it has originated in 
that way; there is no necessity accompanying the thought, and so no 
objectivity lending weight to the hypothesis.56 Nature need be 
conceived as no more than an interworking of mechanical drives, a 
play of nonlocal forces universally permeating the whole of being and 
thus coercing it uniformly in every point; conscious agency, however, 
presupposes individual points of agency and efficacy, hence the 
capacity for novelty and starting-anew that we call ‘freedom’. Nature is 
uniform and homeostatic, while the social order is differentiated and 
sometimes erratic, hence a field of singular actions performed by 
plural agents. Nature is the domain of the all-alike, while the ethical 
order is a harmonization of unique individuals.57 Fichte at one point 
offers a definite contrast between the Wissenschaftslehre and what he 
calls the ‘new Spinozism’: “Knowing is supposed to come about as a 
necessary consequence of nature, a higher power of nature—taking 
the term in a sense that extends all the way to empirical being. But 
this contradicts the inner nature of knowing, which is to be absolute 
origination, a coming into being from the essence of freedom, not of 
being.”58  
 
Philosophical Methodology: Transcendental or Absolute 
Idealism?  
 
While Fichte and Schelling seem almost viscerally focused on 
rejecting each other’s approach to explaining nature and freedom (as 
universal and singular modes of activity), a subtler difference between 
the two concerns the question of philosophical methodology, or in their 
jargon, ‘intellectual intuition’ and ‘philosophical construction’. Each 
tries to convince the other that his efforts have a credible and solid 
Kantian basis—Schelling refers to the Third Critique’s discussion of 
reason’s demand for unconditioned necessary, Fichte to the First 
Critique’s picture of knowing as a synthesis of concepts and intuitions. 
Fichte clarifies his more recent thoughts about methodology in the 
Announcement for the New Version of the Wissenschaftslehre as an 
active but systematic knowing, a mathesis proceeding in something 
like geometrical ‘evidence’, whose every element is an intuition.59 
Indeed Fichte had previously rejected the idea that a ‘thought’ is 
anything other than an arrested intuition, a single frame snipped from 
the cinematic flow of the I’s essentially self-reverting activity or 
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agility.60 Schelling seems to have a slightly more conceptual approach, 
even when he uses the same term, ‘intellectual intuition’, for his 
version of reason-intuition is a convergence of ultimate opposites—
knower and known, subject and object, universality and particularity—
which merge in an ultimately self-actualizing idea, something like the 
old metaphysical idea of the ontological proof of God’s existence, but 
this time done from God’s stance, not from the outside, and resulting 
in something more dynamic and illuminating than ‘certainty’ about an 
outside entity’s existence.61 Though he does not use Fichte’s language 
of freedom and act to speak of reason and its work, what Schelling 
does say of it presumes a contemplative activity in the reader that 
ultimately sparks into the experience of the convergence of knower 
and known. The first nine theorems of the 1801 Presentation of My 
System are extraordinarily difficult in that they wall the reader round 
with ultimate abstractions—‘reason’, ‘identity’, ‘the absolute’—which 
demand sacrifice of reflection, subjectivity, and personal point of view 
if they are to be conceived at all. It is perhaps with some justification 
that Fichte complains of this systematic starting- point that it lacks all 
evidence unless one assumes things smuggled in from the 
Wissenschaftslehre.62 One can imagine his agitated state of mind when 
he writes of the whole attempt: “Polyphemus without an eye.”63  
 
From his side, Schelling seems to have no detailed knowledge of 
the starting-point and methodology of Fichte’s second Jena system, 
delivered in the nova methodo lectures of 1796/99 and put before the 
public in but a few scant pages published in 179764; he seems to take 
the 1794 Foundations as the definitive, not the initial, form of Fichte’s 
system. Fichte’s ‘intellectual intuition’ involves grasping that the I 
which is self-conscious when it is conscious of something is 
immediately and indubitably conscious of itself. This is Kant’s ‘I think’ 
that accompanies all representations, and it is the transcendental 
ground of all representations, all object-consciousness. It is 
transcendental, not empirical; were it empirical, one would have an 
endless regress of new states that grasped the last state of 
consciousness, but never self-consciousness. When one responds to 
the command, “think yourself,” one has self-consciousness, and the 
reason that is so is because, firstly, one does the I, and secondly, one 
interrupts the previous flow of states of consciousness with the novelty 
of the response to the command. Fichte’s argument is not about 
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Cartesian certainty or claimed self-access; it is about activity, 
spontaneity, and agility intuited in immediate self-consciousness. 
Descartes’ meditative claims were first-order and his ‘I think’ is 
empirical; Fichte’s intellectual intuition, as he tries to clarify in a very 
difficult letter to Schelling, is second-order, and though immediate, it 
is more fundamental, one might say ever-present, than any empirical 
state of mind or object-cognition.65 On this basis, Fichte can say that 
Schelling is correct in talking about the identity of knowing and being 
on a relative, that is, first-order or empirical, level. But such a correct 
grasp of relative truth is just half-truth and will not provide the 
systematic foundation for transcendental idealism that they both seek.  
 
It is curious that Fichte writes to Schelling on these 
methodological matters with such assurance, or that the writings of 
1797 lay out such an impeccably simple path to intellectual intuition 
and the I that performs it. When one turns to the fragmentary 
sketches of the 1800 New Version of the Wissenschaftslehre, one sees 
a writer tormented by doubts about whether he can communicate 
what he thinks, or even whether he can steadily and clearly think what 
he intermittently thinks. Schelling never lacks self-assurance, but the 
round-about way he expounds intellectual intuition and its object—I.e., 
the indifference absolute that is the neither-nor of all possible 
predicates--leaves him open to Fichte’s charge that his method is 
wholly conceptual, nothing other than reflection or discursive intellect 
seeking to heal the rift in reflection itself and so unable to get beyond 
a purely conceptual formula: the neither/nor of knowing and being, or 
subject and object, etc.  
 
Schelling’s best explanation of intellectual intuition in 1801-1802 
is buried in a footnote summary that links the two segments of his 
essays on methodology that were separated in different issues of his 
journal. There he says,  
 
Since reason is challenged to conceive the absolute neither as 
thought nor as being, but still to think it, a contradiction arises 
for reflection since it conceives the absolute as either a case of 
thinking or one of being. But intellectual intuition enters even 
into this contradiction and produces the absolute. In this 
breakthrough lies the luminous point where the absolute is 
positively intuited.66  
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The passage goes on to explain that while the function of intuition is 
thus negative within reflection, within philosophical construction it is 
positive and actually exhibits the absolute as a process of interweaving 
opposites (Ineinsbildung)-- an analogy with the work of the 
imagination guided by aesthetic genius which produces totality in finite 
form and reconciles opposites in one concrete shape.67 This sounds 
more prosaic than Fichte’s unearthing of the primordial self-
consciousness underneath all acts of consciousness, but note that 
there is a tacit appeal to subjectivity or personal experience in the 
word “breakthrough” and a tacit invocation of ‘genius’ that the word 
Ineinsbildung brings with it. But should the philosopher take her stand 
with the mystic and the artistic creator as part of the ruling elite, or is 
the call to selfhood and freedom implicit in living in a republic of laws 
and a community of those bound by morality a more universal and 
shareable experience? In either case, it seems there must be some 
empirical analog to anchor transcendental philosophy. 
Notes 
1. Tr. H. S. Harris & Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1977) p. 82. 
2. Tr. Paul Guyer & Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), pp. 700-01. 
3. See Critique of Pure Reason, Preface, Bxvi-xvii. 
4. Ibid., § 13: Principles of a Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts 
of the Understanding, A86/B116 f. 
5. Ibid., Phenomena and Noumena, A235/B294-A240/B299. 
6. Ibid., The Architectonic of Pure Reason, A841/B869 f. 
7. See Kant's famous three questions, The Critique of Pure Reason, On the 
Ideal of the Highest Good, A804/B832 ff. 
8. A few competing accounts of the history of nineteenth-century German 
philosophy should be mentioned. Schelling and Hegel both lectured on 
the history of contemporary philosophy and attempted to outflank 
each other. Within fifteen years of Hegel's death, Johann Eduard 
Erdmann produced three volumes on the development of German 
speculation after Kant; sec Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen 
Darstellung der Geschichte der neuern Philosophie (1834-1853), vols. 
5-7 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1977). Richard 
Kroner's Von Kant bis Hegel, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: J. C. Mohr, 1961) set 
the standard for erudite, although argumentative historiography. 
Walter Schulz reversed the "all roads lead to Hegel" narrative with Die 
Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Texts and Correspondence, 1800-1802, (2012): pg. 1-20. 
Publisher Link. This article is © SUNY Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-
Publications@Marquette. SUNY Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from SUNY Press. 
26 
 
(Stuttgart: Kohlharnmer, 1955). H. S. Harris and George di Giovanni 
enlarged the field of discussion to hitherto neglected figures such as 
Friedrich Jacobi, G. E. Schulze, and K. L. Reinhold in Between Kant and 
Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, 2nd ed. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000). Three recent works 
have enlarged the discussion to include the early German Romantics, 
intimates of both Fichte and Schelling in their Jena years: Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: the Theory 
of Literature in German Romanticism, tr. Philip Barnard & Cheryl 
Lester (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), Manfred 
Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, tr. 
by Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2004), and Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle 
against Subjectivism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
9. Quoted in Daniel Breazeale's introduction to Fichte: Early Philosophical 
Writings (Itl1aca & London: Cornell University Press, 1988) p. 14. 
10. Heidegger's attempt to retrieve Schelling's philosophy in his 1936 lectures 
on Of Human Freedom bravely lays bare the impossibility of genuinely 
rejoining the German idealists in their quest for "system." Whatever 
the fit or "jointure" of being and human being may be, it is not within 
the grasp of one person or of organized learning in general, whether 
segregated in academic institutions or globally floating on a virtual 
cloud supported by machines nicely called "servers." See Schelling's 
Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, tr. Joan Stambaugh 
(Athens, OH & London, Ohio University Press, 1985) pp. 22-68. 
Hereafter cited as Schelling's Treatise. 
11. Athenaeum-Fragmente, #82, cited in Schelling's Treatise, p. 82. 
12. Novalis (Friedrich von Harden berg), Fichte Studies, ed. Jane Kneller 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) #566. 
13. See Gérard Vallée's introduction to The Spinoza Conversations Between 
Lessing and Jacobi: Text with Excerpts from the Ensuing Controversy, 
tr. G. Vallée, J. B. Lawson, and C. G. Chapelle (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1988) pp. 3-36. 
14. See Kant's Opus Postumum, Erste Hiilfte, ed. Artur Buchenau (Berlin & 
Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1936) 12.5-9 and 1.87, respectively. 
15. See Fichte's Second Introduction [to the Wissenschaftslehre], GA I, 4: 
194-95. 
16. See Letter 20 (Schelling in Jena to Fichte in Berlin, October 3, 1801) 
translated in this volume. Schelling apparently did not adequately 
understand, even in 1801, how the practical philosophy of that work 
grounded the theoretical, not the reverse. 
17. Maimonides argues that human wrongdoing will not cease until the 
following condition is met: "every individual among the people not 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Texts and Correspondence, 1800-1802, (2012): pg. 1-20. 
Publisher Link. This article is © SUNY Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-
Publications@Marquette. SUNY Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from SUNY Press. 
27 
 
being permitted to act according to his will and up to the limit of his 
power, but being forced to do that which is useful to the whole." Guide 
of the Perplexed, Vol. II, tr. Schlomo Pines (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1963), p. 510. 
18. J. G. Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts, GA I, 3, 358; Foundations of 
Natural Right, ed. F. Neuhauser, tr. Michael Baur (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. 49. 
19. Novalis, op. cit., #648. 
20. Ibid., #556. 
21. See Paola Mayer, Jena Romanticism and Its Appropriation of Jakob Böhme 
(Montreal & London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) pp. 63-67, 
on Schelling's initially anti-religious reaction to Böhme and the 
transformation of his identity-philosophy 1801-1802 by his use of 
Platonic and Neoplatonic sources, see pp. 182-92. 
22. Athenaeum-Fragmente #206. 
23. See Daniel Breazeale, "Men at Work: Philosophical Construction in Fichte 
and Schelling," forthcoming. 
24. Allen Speight, "Friedrich Schlegel" 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schlegel/), 2007. 
25. See Frederick Beiser, "Friedrich Schlegel's Absolute Idealism," in German 
Idealism, pp. 435-61. 
26. In J. G. Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other 
Writings, tr. Daniel Breazeale (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), pp. 150-
51; GA I, 3, 354. 
27. Daniel Breazeale provides a lively and detailed account of Fichte’s early 
career at Leipzig, Warsaw, Königsberg, Zurich, and finally Jena, from 
1794 to 1799 in Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988) pp. 1-49. 
28. J. G. Fichte, The Vocation of Man, tr. Roderick Chisholm (Indianapolis & 
New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956) pp. 98-99. 
29. Ibid., pp. 134-35. 
30. See Letter 14 translated in this volume, Schelling in Jena to Fichte in 
Berlin, November 19, 1800. 
31. See Letter 23, Fichte to Schelling, January 15, 1802. 
32. See New Version of the Wissenschaftslehre, translated in this volume. 
33. See J. G. Fichte, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy: 
(Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo (1796/99), edited and translated 
by Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
34. See Michael Vater, "The Wissenschaftslehre of 1801-1802," in Fichte: 
Historical Contexts/Contemporary Controversies, ed. Daniel Breazeale 
and Tom Rockmore (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1994) 
pp. 191-210. 
35. Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre 1801/1802 (GA II/6: 317; cf. SW II: 153). 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Texts and Correspondence, 1800-1802, (2012): pg. 1-20. 
Publisher Link. This article is © SUNY Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-
Publications@Marquette. SUNY Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from SUNY Press. 
28 
 
36. See Letter 20, Schelling in Jena to Fichte in Berlin, October 3, 1801. 
37. See Kant, Ideal of Pure Reason, Critique of Pure, A568/B596-A583/B611. 
38. C. A. Eschenmayer, Die Philosophie in ihrem Übergang zur 
Nichtphilosophie (Erlangen, 1803). 
39. Schelling, Werke, VI, 23-26. 
40. Ibid., 137-47. See F. W. J. Schelling, System of Philosophy in General, tr. 
Thomas Pfau, in Idealism and the Endgame of Theory (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994) pp. 14 1-47. . 
41. A plethora of journals and plans for even more journals are discussed in 
the letters: the venerable Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung, somewhat 
hostile to the hopes of the transcendental idealists, Fichte’s 
Philosophisches Journal, Schelling's Zeitschrift for spekulative Physik, 
the Athenaeum of the Jena romantics, Reinhold's Beyträge zur 
leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beym Anfange des 
19. Jahrhunderts, a much-discussed common front journal that never 
materialized, and Schelling and Hegel's Kritisches Journal. For a 
detailed discussion of them, see J G. Fichte et F.W.J Schelling: 
Correspondance (1794-1802) edited and translated into French by 
Myriam Bienenstock (Paris: P.U.F., 1991) pp. 15-22. 
42. See Letter 24, Schelling in Jena to Fichte in Berlin, January 25, 1802―the 
final letter of the exchange. 
43. See Letter 19, Fichte in Berlin to Schelling, May 31 to August 7, 1801. 
44. See Letter 20, Schelling in Jena to Fichte in Berlin, October 3, 1801. 
45. J. G. Fichte, First Introduction, §§ 4-5, in: Introductions to the 
Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings, op. cit., GA I, 3, 195. 
46. See "While Reading Schelling's Transcendental Idealism," translated in 
this volume. 
47. See Letter 13. Fichte in Berlin to Schelling in Jena, November 15, 1800. 
48. See Letter 14. Schelling in Jena to Fichte in Berlin, November 19, 1800. 
49. See Letter 15a, translated in this volume. 
50. This draft was first published by F. Medicus, Fichtes Leben und literarische 
Briefwechsel (1922), and included in Fichte-Schelling Briefwechsel, ed. 
Walter Schulz (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1968) p. 114. Hereafter 
cited as Schulz. 
51. See Letter 15, Fichte to Schelling in Jena, December 27, 1800. 
52. See Letter 15a (cf. Schulz, p. 115). 
53. See 1800 New Version of the Wissenschaftslehre, translated in this 
volume. 
54. See Letter 14, Schelling in Jena to Fichte in Berlin, November 19, 1800. 
55. See Presentation of My System, translated in this volume. 
56. Fichte, GA II/6: 220f. (cf. SW II: 82). 
57. Ibid., pp. 305-06 (cf. SW II: 143-44). 
58. Ibid., pp. 290-91 (cf. SW II: 130-31). 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Texts and Correspondence, 1800-1802, (2012): pg. 1-20. 
Publisher Link. This article is © SUNY Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-
Publications@Marquette. SUNY Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from SUNY Press. 
29 
 
59. See Fichte's Announcement, translated in this volume. 
60. J. G. Fichte, An Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre 
(1797/1798), in Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 
118. GA I, 3, 280. 
61. See Schelling's essay on intellectual intuition in Further Presentations 
from the System of Philosophy, translated in this volume. 
62. See Fichte, "On the Presentation of Schelling's System of Identity," 
translated in this volume. 
63. See Fichte, "Preparatory Work Contra Schelling," translated in this 
volume. 
64. See Second Introduction, §§ 3 & 5, and Chapter One, II of Attempt at a 
New Presentation, in Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, as cited, 
pp. 40-41 46-49, & 110-15; GA I, 3: 212-13, 216-19, 274-78. 
65. See Letter 23, Fichte to Schelling, January 15, 1802. Compare the equally 
difficult Letter 19, Fichte in Berlin to Schelling in Jena, May 31 to 
August 7, 1801, where intellectual intuition is said to access not just 
the transcendental ground of the finite I but the divine self-
consciousness that is both the ground of the separation of finite I's and 
their essential unity. 
66. Schellings Werke, IV: 391-92n. 
67. See Schelling's two essays on methodology, the first on intellectual 
intuition, the second on philosophical construction, translated in this 
volume. 
